December 21, 2016

The Honorable Jeff Atwater  
Chief Financial Officer  
The Capitol, PL-11  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0301  

Dear Mr. Atwater:


If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Teresa Michael  
Inspector General  

cc: Robert Kneip, Chief of Staff  
Kathy DuBose, Coordinator, Joint Legislative Auditing Committee
# Six-Month Follow-Up Report

**Title:** Special Disability Trust Fund Claims Manager 2004 System

**Date Published:** June 21, 2016

The Department did not timely deactivate the access privileges for a former employee to prevent the former employee or others from misusing the former employee's access privileges.

We recommend that Department management ensure that user account access privileges of former employees are timely deactivated.

We concur. The Department has many effective processes in place to ensure timely termination of former employee accounts. The two accounts identified were an anomaly to these processes as the corresponding accesses required transition to new staff and others are tied to existing business processes preventing one of the accounts from being fully deactivated. The Department has restricted the functionality of the one remaining account to the extent possible without limiting our ability to comply with public records request requirements. Access to the account is appropriately restricted to designated staff who are authorized to perform these functions. The account will be required for this purpose until the Department procures and transitions all related records to another resource.

**Six-month Follow-up:** November 20, 2016

**Responsible Division:** Division of Information Systems (DIS)

**Reported Status:** DIS successfully modified the public records process to no longer require use of the former employee's network account. The related network account was terminated on October 24, 2016.

**Expected Completion Date for Corrective Action:** October 24, 2016

**OIG Assessment:** Closed. Based on the documentation provided by DIS, it appears that appropriate action was taken to address the finding.
### DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
### OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
### SIX-MONTH FOLLOW-UP REPORT
### STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTION

**Confidential Finding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reviewing Entity</th>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Finding 2**

Certain security controls related to physical security, confidential and exempt data, and monitoring of the SDTF System and related IT resources continue to need improvement to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SDTF System data and related IT resources.

**Recommendation**

We recommend that Department management improve certain security controls related to physical security, confidential and exempt data, and monitoring of the SDTF System and related IT resources to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SDTF System data and related IT resources.

**Original Response**

We concur. The Department had made significant improvement in restricting physical security by building a restricted area. The physical security matter identified was resolved as of February 4, 2016. The additional business process concerns will be evaluated, and where appropriate, additional security controls will be implemented to further enhance security of system data and related resources.

**Six-month Follow-up:** November 20, 2016

**Responsible Divisions**

Division of Information Systems

**Reported Status**

DWC management strengthened controls related to physical security, and confidential and exempt data. DIS is in the process of improving controls to monitor the SDTF System and related IT resources.

**Expected Completion Date for Corrective Action**

May 2017

**OIG Assessment**

Partially Completed. Based on the information provided it appears that the DWC has taken corrective action to address two of the three subparts (Confidential Finding #1 and #2) of this finding. The DIS has taken certain action to address the remaining subpart (Confidential Finding #3). The Office of Inspector General (OIG) will continue monitoring this finding until sufficient corrective action is taken.